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SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
    
 “The class action is an ingenious device for 
economizing on the expense of litigation and enabling small 
claims to be litigated.  The two points are closely related.  If 
every small claim had to be litigated separately, the 
vindication of small claims would be rare.  The fixed costs of 
litigation make it impossible.”  Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck 
and Co., 547 F.3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2008).  But not every 
group of plaintiffs should be granted class action status, 
because “[t]he class action is an ‘exception to the usual rule 
that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual 
named parties only.”  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 
U.S. 338, 348 (2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 
U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)). 
 When thinking of a class action brought under Rule 
23(b)(3), we typically think of a large aggregation of 
individuals (hundreds or even thousands), each with small 
claims.  This case is quite different from that.  Here, we are 
faced with a putative class of twenty-two large and 
sophisticated corporations, most of which have multi-million 
dollar claims, who wish to take advantage of the class action 
device.  While we do not foreclose the possibility of class 
status in this case, or where the putative class is of similar 
composition, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing 
that the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) has been 
satisfied.  We now provide a framework for district courts to 
apply when conducting their numerosity analyses, and we 
will remand to the District Court to allow such an analysis in 
this case.   
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I.   
 A.  Regulatory Framework 
 The 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act (the “Hatch-Waxman Act”), 98 Stat. 1585, as 
amended, provides a regulatory framework designed in part to 
(1) ensure that only rigorously tested drugs are marketed, (2) 
incentivize drug manufacturers to invest in new research and 
development, and (3) encourage generic entry into the 
marketplace.  The Hatch-Waxman Act requires a drug 
manufacturer wishing to market a new brand-name drug to 
first submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”) to the federal 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), and then undergo a 
long, complex, and costly testing process.  See 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(b)(1) (requiring, among other things, “full reports of 
investigations” into safety and effectiveness; “a full list of the 
articles used as components”; and a “full description” of how 
the drug is manufactured, processed, and packed); see also 
F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228-29 (2013) 
(describing the statutory framework).  If this process is 
successful, the FDA will grant the drug manufacturer 
approval to market the brand-name drug.  After this approval, 
a generic manufacturer can obtain similar approval by 
submitting an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) 
that “shows that the generic drug has the same active 
ingredients as, and is biologically equivalent to, the brand-
name drug.”  Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 
132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012) (citing 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv)).  This way, a generic manufacturer is 
not required to undergo the same costly approval procedures 
to develop a drug that has already satisfied the FDA.  Actavis, 
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133 S. Ct. at 2228 (“The Hatch-Waxman process, by allowing 
the generic to piggy-back on the pioneer’s approval efforts, 
‘speed[s] the introduction of low-cost generic drugs to 
market,’ thereby furthering drug competition.” (quoting 
Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676)).   
 The FDA will not give final approval to produce a 
generic version of a drug that is entitled to non-patent 
exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman Act, and it “cannot 
authorize a generic drug that would infringe a patent.”  
Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676.  Thus, among other things, an 
ANDA’s approval will depend on “the scope and duration of 
the patents covering the brand-name drug.”  Id.  Brand 
manufacturers are required to include the patent number and 
expiration date of the patent that covers the drug or that 
covers a method of using that drug in their NDAs, which are 
then published by the FDA in the Orange Book, more 
formally known as the Approved Drug Products with 
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations.  Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(b)(1) and 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.53(c)(2)(ii)(P)(3), (3) 
(2011)).  Once a patent has been listed in the Orange Book, 
the generic manufacturer is free to file an ANDA if it can 
certify that its proposed generic drug will not actually violate 
the brand manufacturer’s patents.  Id.  Under 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(vii), there are four ways in which a generic 
manufacturer can make this certification: 
(I) that such patent information has not been 
filed, 
(II) that such patent has expired, 
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(III) of the date on which such patent will 
expire, or  
(IV) that such patent is invalid or will not be 
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the 
new drug for which the application is 
submitted. 
An ANDA with a paragraph IV certification may only be 
filed after the expiration of the fourth year of the New 
Chemical Entity (“NCE”) five-year exclusivity period.1  21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(E)(ii).  The “‘paragraph IV’ route[] 
automatically counts as patent infringement.”  Actavis, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2228 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A)).  As a result, 
this often “means provoking litigation” instituted by the brand 
manufacturer.  Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1677.   
 If the brand manufacturer initiates a patent 
infringement suit, the FDA must withhold approval of the 
generic for at least 30 months while the parties litigate the 
validity or infringement of the patent.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 
2228 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)).  If the suit has 
concluded at the end of this 30-month period, then the FDA 
will follow the outcome of the litigation.  Id.  However, if the 
litigation is still proceeding, the FDA may give its approval to 
the generic drug manufacturer to begin marketing a generic 
version of the drug.  Id.  The generic manufacture then has 
                                                 
1 This exclusivity period is granted via the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, and has nothing to do with whether the drug is covered 
by a patent.   
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the option to “launch at risk,” meaning that if the ongoing 
court proceeding ultimately determines that the patent was 
valid and infringed, the generic firm will be liable for lost 
profits despite the FDA’s approval.  C. Scott Hemphill, 
Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a 
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1553, 1609 
(2006).   
 In order to incentivize a generic drug manufacturer to 
challenge weak patents, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides that 
the first generic manufacturer to file a paragraph IV 
certification will enjoy a 180-day exclusivity period.  21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).  This means that during this 
exclusivity period, “no other generic can compete with the 
brand-name drug,” Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229, an opportunity 
that can be “‘worth several hundred million dollars,’” to the 
first-filer, id. (quoting Hemphill, supra, at 1579).2  It is during 
this generic exclusivity period that the “vast majority of 
potential profits for a generic drug manufacturer materialize.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  That is because once 
                                                 
2 It is a common practice for a brand manufacturer to market 
its own generic version of the drug when generic entry 
occurs.  Unlike an ANDA filer, the brand manufacturer is not 
barred from entering the generic market during the 180-day 
exclusivity period to which the first paragraph IV filer is 
entitled.  See Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 
51, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) did not prevent the filer of the original 
NDA from launching its own generic during the 180-day 
exclusivity period).   
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the exclusivity period has expired other generic 
manufacturers are free to enter the market, bringing the price 
down to competitive levels.  Importantly, this 180-day 
exclusivity period belongs only to the first generic 
manufacturer to file; if the first-filer forfeits its exclusivity 
rights, no other generic manufacturer is entitled to it.  Id. 
(citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)).     
 B.  Facts 
 In April 1997, the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office issued U.S. Patent No. 5,618,845 (“the ′845 patent”) to 
Cephalon, Inc. (“Cephalon”), a pharmaceutical company.  
The ′845 patent claimed a specific particle-size distribution of 
modafinil, a wakefulness-promoting agent used to treat 
narcolepsy and other sleep disorders, and Cephalon later 
applied for a reissue of the patent, resulting in the issuance of 
U.S. Reissue Patent No. 37,516 (“the ′516 patent”) in January 
2002.  Thus, Cephaolon’s use of modafinil was protected by a 
patent until October 6, 2014, to be later extended until April 
6, 2015.   
 In December 1998, the FDA approved Cephalon’s 
NDA for the brand-name drug Provigil and granted it NCE 
exclusivity.  This five-year period of exclusivity was 
extended until December 24, 2005, due to Cephalon’s status 
as an orphan drug.3  In March 2006, Cephalon obtained 
                                                 
3 An orphan drug is used to treat a rare disease or ailment.  
Because pharmaceutical companies may lack the financial 
incentive to develop such drugs, the Orphan Drug Act 
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pediatric exclusivity, which added an additional six months of 
exclusivity.  21 U.S.C. § 355a(c).  Thus, in the absence of the 
‘516 patent, Cephalon’s exclusivity period for modafinil 
would have ended on June 24, 2006.   
 On December 24, 2002, the first day that an ANDA for 
modafinil could be filed, four generic drug manufacturers – 
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd. and Teva 
Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc. (collectively “Teva”); Ranbaxy 
Laboratories, Ltd. and Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(collectively “Ranbaxy”); Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and  
Mylan Inc. (collectively “Mylan”); and Barr Laboratories, 
Inc. (“Barr”) – each independently filed an ANDA with 
paragraph IV certifications seeking to sell generic modafinil 
products.  Due to FDA guidance promulgated after the 
paragraph IV certifications in this case were filed, all four 
generic manufacturers were treated as being the first filer, and 
thus all four would have shared in the 180-day exclusivity 
period, making it less valuable to each individual generic 
manufacturer.  See Guidance for Industry on 180-Day 
Exclusivity when Multiple Abbreviated New Drug 
Applications are Submitted on the Same Day, 68 Fed. Reg. 
45252, 45255 (Aug. 1, 2003).   
 Because the filing of the paragraph IV certification 
“automatically counts as patent infringement,” Actavis, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2228 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A)), Cephalon sued 
the four generic manufacturers for patent infringement in the 
                                                                                                             
provides the brand manufacturer with a seven-year period of 
non-patent exclusivity.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a).   
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District of New Jersey on March 28, 2003.  While motions for 
summary judgment were pending, Cephalon entered into 
what are known as “reverse-payment settlements”4 with each 
of the four generic manufacturers.  First, Cephalon settled 
with Teva on December 9, 2005.  This agreement ended the 
patent litigation between Cephalon and Teva, and as a result 
Teva was granted a license to sell modafinil in October 2012, 
which was before the expiration of Cephalon’s patent but 
several years later than Teva could have entered the market if 
it had launched its generic “at-risk.”  In exchange for its 
agreement to settle, Teva was paid millions of dollars to stay 
out of the market via royalty agreements, supply agreements, 
and other contractual provisions.  Importantly, the only term 
of the deal that was publicized was what is known as the 
“contingent launch provision.”  This provision allowed Teva 
to enter the generic modafinil market if any other company 
entered the market for any reason.   
 Almost two weeks later, on December 22, 2005, 
Ranbaxy entered into a similar reverse-payment settlement 
agreement with Cephalon on slightly less favorable terms, but 
also with a contingent launch provision.  Again, the 
                                                 
4 In a reverse-payment settlement, “a party with no claim for 
damages (something that is usually true of a paragraph IV 
litigation defendant) walks away with money simply so that it 
will stay away from the patentee’s market.”  F.T.C. v. 
Actavis, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2233 (2013).  Such agreements 
are subject to antitrust scrutiny under the “rule of reason” 
inquiry because such settlements, “where large and 
unjustified, can bring with it the risk of significant 
anticompetitive effects.”  Id. at 2237.    
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contingent launch provision was publicized via press release.  
Two weeks after the Ranbaxy settlement, on January 9, 2006, 
Mylan entered into a similar agreement – on less favorable 
terms than Ranbaxy – but also with a publicized contingent 
launch provision.  The final remaining paragraph IV filer, 
Barr, settled on the least favorable terms on February 1, 2006.  
It too had a contingent launch provision, which was 
publicized as well.  Because no subsequent paragraph IV filer 
would be entitled to the 180-day exclusivity period, there was 
no incentive for another generic manufacturer to unilaterally 
bear the litigation expenses for the reward that it would have 
to share with any other generic manufacturer who wanted to 
enter the market.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D).5   
 The Direct Purchaser Plaintiff (“DPP”) putative class, 
appellees in this case, filed suit on April 27, 2006, alleging a 
global conspiracy involving Cephalon and all four generic 
                                                 
5 Generic manufacturer Apotex Inc. nonetheless filed a 
declaratory judgment action in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania in June 2006 alleging non-infringement, 
invalidity, and unenforceability of the ′516 patent.  Apotex 
Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-2768, 2011 WL 6090696, 
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2011).  The District Court held that 
the patent was invalid and unenforceable on November 7, 
2011, a ruling which was upheld on appeal.  Apotex Inc. v. 
Cephalon, Inc., 500 F. App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per 
curiam).  The District Court, in a separate opinion, also held 
that Apotex would not infringe the ′516 patent.  Apotex, Inc. 
v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-2768, 2012 WL 1080148, at 
*1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2012) 
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defendants under 15 U.S.C. § 1; four separate conspiracies 
between Cephalon and each generic defendant under the same 
statute; and a monopolization claim against Cephalon under 
15 U.S.C. § 2.  The DPP class is made up of wholesalers who 
purchased Provigil directly from Cephalon.6   
 The District Court, with the full support of the parties, 
ordered that motions regarding class certification were not to 
be filed until after fact and expert discovery and the motions 
for summary judgment had been filed.   Thus, the DPP class 
did not file its motion for class certification until May 12, 
2014, after more than eight years of litigation.  
Approximately one month later, on June 23, 2014, the District 
Court granted summary judgment in favor of all of the 
defendants on the DPP class’ global antitrust conspiracy 
claim.  Over the next 13 months, several letter motions and 
hearings were held on the class certification issue, and the 
District Court certified the DPP class on July 27, 2015.  
During this period, Cephalon, Teva, and Barr settled with the 
DPP class for $512 million on April 17, 2015.  A settlement 
                                                 
6 Other parties challenging the reverse-payment settlement 
agreements are a putative class of end-payors, generic 
competitor Apotex Inc., several retail plaintiffs, and the 
F.T.C., which originally filed suit in the District Court for the 
District of Colombia before being transferred to Judge 
Goldberg’s docket.  The FTC sued only Cephalon.  Teva 
purchased Cephalon on October 14, 2011, and on May 18, 
2015, the F.T.C. settled with Teva for $1.2 billion.  The 
remaining suits are consolidated for purposes of liability, and 
they have all been stayed pending our ruling on the DPP class 
certification issue.   
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class, which has the exact same composition as the putative 
DPP class at issue here, was also certified on July 27, 2015, 
and the settlement itself was approved by the District Court 
on October 15, 2015.  Thus, the only defendants remaining at 
the time of the DPP certification decision being appealed 
were Ranbaxy and Mylan (collectively “Defendants”). 
II.   
 Defendants challenge two aspects of the District 
Court’s class certification decision – numerosity and 
predominance.  Thus, even though other issues were 
contested at the District Court level, we focus only on the 
District Court’s numerosity analysis under Rule 23(a)(1) and 
its predominance analysis under Rule 23(b)(3).   
 Plaintiffs argued before the District Court that the class 
was comprised of twenty-two members.  Defendants 
challenged the inclusion of four of these members.  Thus, the 
District Court began its numerosity analysis by determining 
the proper class size because “relevant precedent makes 
significant distinctions between classes containing more than 
twenty class members and those containing twenty or fewer.”  
King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 309 
F.R.D. 195, 204 (E.D. Pa. 2015).  Defendants challenged two 
class members’ inclusion solely for numerosity purposes 
because they were partial assignees of two other class 
members.  They argued that counting the partial assignees 
would essentially allow the DPP class to “double dip” and 
artificially inflate the class size.  Defendants next challenged 
the inclusion of a class member that ceased operations prior 
to generic entry actually occurred, arguing that there was no 
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way to know whether it would have actually purchased 
generic modafinil.  Lastly, Defendants challenged the class 
status of a class member that only purchased branded Provigil 
from Cephalon after generic modafinil had already entered 
the market.  Defendants argued that there was no overcharge 
as a result of this.  The District Court rejected all of 
Defendants’ challenges to the class size.  Id. at 204-06.   
 The District Court next considered whether joinder of 
these twenty-two class members was impracticable such that 
class certification was appropriate under Rule 23(a)(1).  
While the District Court acknowledged that a class of twenty-
two members was small compared to most class actions, the 
District Court found persuasive several district court cases in 
the reverse-payment settlement context with similarly-
situated classes where the numerosity requirement was found 
to be satisfied.  Id. at 204 (collecting cases)   
 In analyzing whether joinder was impracticable, the 
District Court examined five factors: “(1) judicial economy, 
(2) geographic dispersion, (3) financial resources of class 
members, (4) the claimant’s ability to institute individual 
suits, and (5) requests for injunctive relief that could affect 
future class members.”  Id. at 203-04 (quoting In re 
Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., No. 08-2431, 2011 WL 
3563385, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2011)).  The District Court 
placed great weight on the judicial economy factor, with 
particular emphasis on the late stage of the litigation.  
Specifically, the Court stated: “Considering the extensive 
history of this litigation and the exhaustive discovery that has 
been conducted,  . . . judicial economy is best served by 
trying this case as a class action.  Joinder of the absent class 
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members would likely require additional rounds of discovery, 
which would only further delay a trial date.”  Id. at 206-07.     
Relatedly, the District Court also expressed the 
concern that if the class was not certified at this late date, 
unnamed class members would bring individual suits in other 
jurisdictions instead of seeking to be joined in the suit before 
him.  Id. at 207 (“Further, if cases were brought within other 
jurisdictions, additional discovery is certainly a possibility, 
and separate trials could result in inconsistent verdicts.”).  
The other primary factor that the District Court found to 
weigh in favor of numerosity was the geographic dispersion 
of the class members, who were spread out over thirteen 
states and Puerto Rico.  Id.    
On the other hand, the Court noted that some factors 
weighed against class certification.  First, the class members’ 
vast financial resources weighed against certification, as each 
was a sophisticated corporation.  Id.  The District Court also 
looked to their incentive to bring individual claims, stating 
that the class members’ ability to bring individual suits 
generally weighed against certification, but equivocating 
somewhat because the six class members with claims below 
$1 million “likely do not have the same incentive to engage in 
costly antitrust litigation on their own.”  Id.  It is not clear 
what weight was ultimately placed on the parties’ financial 
incentive to bring suit, and the District Court appeared to treat 
this as either a neutral factor or one that weighed in favor of 
Defendants.  Ultimately, the District Court held that the 
requirements of Rule 23(a)(1) were satisfied and the class was 
sufficiently numerous such that joinder was impracticable.  
Id.  
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 The District Court next addressed Defendants’ 
predominance argument that, after the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment on the global conspiracy claim, 
common issues of law and fact did not predominate over 
individualized inquiries under Rule 23(b)(3).  Id. at 209.  
Defendants argued that the damages model of Plaintiffs’ 
expert, Dr. Leitzinger, no longer matched Plaintiffs’ theory of 
liability because it did not isolate the harm caused by each 
individual reverse-payment settlement.  Defendants claimed 
that this mismatch is analogous to the problem at issue in the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 
S. Ct. 1426 (2013).  Related to this argument, Defendants 
relied upon the doctrine of antitrust standing to support the 
view that, in the absence of a global conspiracy, each class 
member would have to show which agreement harmed him, 
and that this would necessarily be an individualized inquiry.  
The District Court rejected these arguments, concluding that 
Plaintiffs had antitrust standing and that the doctrine of joint 
and several liability was appropriate.  Thus, it concluded that 
Comcast was not controlling because Dr. Leitzinger’s 
damages model “matches Plaintiffs’ remaining theory of 
liability and impact.”  Id. at 214.    
III.   
 “The class action is an exception to the usual rule that 
litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual 
named parties only.”  Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 348 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In order to justify this exception to 
the rule, “every putative class action must satisfy the four 
requirements of Rule 23(a) and the requirements of either 
Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3).”  Marcus v. BMW of N.A., LLC, 
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687 F.3d 583, 590 (2012).  In order to satisfy Rule 23(a), a 
plaintiff must show:  
(1) the class must be “so numerous that joinder 
of all members is impracticable” (numerosity); 
(2) there must be “questions of law or fact 
common to the class” (commonality); (3) “the 
claims or defenses of the representative parties” 
must be “typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class” (typicality); and (4) the named plaintiffs 
must “fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class” (adequacy of representation, or 
simply adequacy). 
In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 275, 291 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23).  Rule 23(b)(3), which is the 
basis for certification here, “requires that (i) common 
questions of law or fact predominate (predominance), and (ii) 
the class action is the superior method for adjudication 
(superiority).”  Marcus, 687 F.3d at 591 (quoting In re Cmty. 
Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d at 291).  “The party seeking 
certification bears the burden of establishing each element of 
Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Id.   
 We have held that “the decision to certify a class calls 
for findings by the court, not merely a ‘threshold showing’ by 
a party, that each requirement of Rule 23 is met,” and that 
“[f]actual determinations supporting Rule 23 findings must be 
made by a preponderance of the evidence.”  In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008).  
In addition, a court “must resolve all factual or legal disputes 
relevant to class certification, even if they overlap with the 
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merits – including disputes touching on elements of the cause 
of action.”  Id.  Class certification will thus be “proper only 
‘if the trial court, is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the 
prerequisites’ of Rule 23 are met.”  Id. (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. 
of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)); see also Newton 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 
166 (3d Cir. 2001) (“A class certification decision requires a 
thorough examination of the factual and legal allegations.”). 
 Thus, while a district court “possesses broad discretion 
to control proceedings and frame issues for consideration 
under Rule 23,” such discretion “does not soften the rule 
[that] a class may not be certified without a finding that each 
Rule 23 requirement is met.”  Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d 
at 310.  This is particularly true because, acknowledging the 
practicalities of class litigation, we have said that class 
certification “is often the defining moment in class actions 
(for it may sound the ‘death knell’ of the litigation on the part 
of plaintiffs, or create unwarranted pressure to settle 
nonmeritorious claims on the part of defendants).”  Newton, 
259 F.3d at 162.   
  “We review a class certification order for abuse of 
discretion, which occurs if the district court’s decision rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion 
of law or an improper application of law to fact.”  Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 312 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Although Defendants raise the issue of predominance first, 
the requirements of Rule 23(a) are “threshold requirements,” 
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997), 
and we therefore address them first.  
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 A.  Numerosity  
 Rule 23(a)(1) sets forth what is commonly known as 
the numerosity requirement.  The text is, however, 
conspicuously devoid of any numerical minimum required for 
class certification.  Instead, the rule simply states that the 
numerosity requirement is satisfied when “the class is so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.”  Fed 
R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).  “Impracticable does not mean 
impossible,” Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir. 
1993), and refers rather to the difficulties of achieving 
joinder.  This calls for an inherently fact-based analysis that 
requires a district court judge to “take into account the 
context of the particular case,” thereby providing district 
courts considerable discretion in making numerosity 
determinations.  Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Morgan 
Stanley & Co., 772 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2014).  A district 
court abuses that discretion, however, when it considers 
issues that have no place in the numerosity requirement.  
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 312.  In this case, the District 
Court abused its discretion by improperly emphasizing the 
late stage of the proceeding and by not considering the ability 
of individual class members to pursue their cases through the 
use of joinder.7 
 While “[n]o minimum number of plaintiffs is required 
to maintain a suit as a class action,” our Court has said that 
“generally if the named plaintiff demonstrates that the 
                                                 
7 Despite this conclusion,  we recognize the thoughtful work 
of the District Court, which was diligently done even though 
there is a paucity of precedent on the numerosity issue. 
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potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40, the first prong of 
Rule 23(a) has been met.”  Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 
220, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Robidoux, 987 F.2d at 
936 (“[T]he difficulty in joining as few as 40 putative class 
members should raise a presumption that joinder is 
impracticable.”).  At the other end of the spectrum, the 
Supreme Court has stated in dicta that a class of fifteen was 
“too small to meet the numerosity requirement.”  Gen. Tel. 
Co. of the Nw, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331 (1980).  
Leading treatises have collected cases and recognized the 
general rule that “[a] class of 20 or fewer is usually 
insufficiently numerous . . . [a] class of 41 or more is usually 
sufficiently numerous . . . . [while] [c]lasses with between 21 
and 40 members are given varying treatment.  These mid-
sized classes may or may not meet the numerosity 
requirement depending on the circumstances of each 
particular case.”  5 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore’s 
Federal Practice § 23.22; see also 5 William B. Rubenstein, 
Newberg on Class Actions § 3:12 (“As a general guideline . . . 
a class that encompasses fewer than 20 members will likely 
not be certified absent other indications of impracticability of 
joinder, while a class of 40 or more members raises a 
presumption of impracticability of joinder based on numbers 
alone.” (internal footnotes omitted)); Cox v. Am. Cast Iron 
Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1553 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Moore 
favorably).    
 At this point, we need not specify a “floor” at which a 
putative class will fail to satisfy the numerosity requirement.  
Instead, we simply note that the number of class members is 
the starting point of our numerosity analysis.  Although 
district courts are always under an obligation to ensure that 
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joinder is impracticable, their inquiry into impracticability 
should be particularly rigorous when the putative class 
consists of fewer than forty members.  Because the District 
Court certified a class of twenty-two members, which is only 
slightly above the twenty-member floor suggested by the 
leading treatises, we first address Defendants’ challenge to 
the size of the putative class concerning the partial 
assignment of some claims.  After determining that the class 
is comprised of twenty-two members, we scrutinize the 
District Court’s numerosity reasoning in this case.  Because 
the District Court erred in its analysis of the two most 
important factors applicable here, we see no need to examine 
the other factors and will remand for the District Court to 
again engage in a numerosity inquiry consistent with the 
reasoning in this opinion.     
  1.  The Size of the Class 
 The District Court rejected Defendants’ argument that 
two class members should not be included in the class for 
numerosity purposes because they were partial assignees of 
two other class members.  If Defendants were correct, the 
class would be comprised of only twenty class members, not 
twenty-two.  On the other hand, for the first time on appeal, 
Plaintiffs argue that they have uncovered three more 
assignees of claims, and that the class consists of twenty-five 
members.   
 Defendants appear to have abandoned their partial 
assignment argument on appeal, arguing in one sentence that 
“four of the 22 potential class members were improperly 
 27 
 
included in the class.”  Appellant Br. at 48.8  Defendants 
make no reference to case law and rely simply on cursory 
citations to the record.  We could, for good reason, deem 
these arguments abandoned and waived on appeal.  Kost v. 
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993).  However, 
because we are remanding the numerosity issue to the District 
Court, we think it appropriate to consider this issue pertaining 
to the size of the class because the partial assignability issue 
impacts whether the three additional class members should be 
included in the class on remand.  See Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 
F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2005) (“This Court has discretionary 
power to address issues that have been waived.”).   
                                                 
8 Defendants raised two other challenges to the size of the 
class before the District Court and in a cursory manner on 
appeal.  They argue (1) that named plaintiff King Drug 
Company of Florence, Inc. (“King Drug”) should not be 
included in the class because it went out of business before 
generic modafinil entered the market in 2012, and thus there 
is no way of knowing if it would have even purchased generic 
modafinil, and (2) that Drogueria Betances should not be 
included in the class because all of its brand modafinil 
purchases were made after generic entry.  We see no need to 
question the inclusion of these two class members.  King 
Drug presented testimony showing that it would have 
purchased generic modafinil instead of Provigil if it had been 
on the market.  Similarly, the experts of both parties agreed 
that it takes several months before prices fall to competitive 
levels after generic entry.  Because Drogueria Betances made 
its brand modafinil purchases only one month after generic 
entry, it is conceivable that it paid an overcharge.   
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 Initially, Defendants’ partial assignment argument 
makes intuitive sense.  Why should Plaintiffs be able to take 
one claim and turn it into two for numerosity purposes?  How 
is this not a form of “double dipping”?  Nevertheless, no 
matter how intuitively appealing this argument may be, it 
lacks legal support.  The text of Rule 23(a)(1) says nothing 
about the number of claims; instead, it refers to the number of 
class members.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) (requiring an inquiry 
into whether “the class is so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable” (emphasis added)).   
 Moreover, as the District Court recognized, there is 
persuasive circuit precedent establishing that partial assignees 
are appropriately considered to be members of a class.  In In 
re Fine Paper Litigation, 632 F.2d 1081, 1089 (3d Cir. 1980), 
the state of Washington was the recipient of partial 
assignments of antitrust claims.  It sought to be excluded from 
the settlement class, and the district court held, among other 
reasons for denying the right to opt out, that “the state’s 
assertion of the assigned claims would result in an 
impermissible fragmentation of the . . . causes of action.”  Id.  
We reversed and “reject[ed] the defendant’s position that the 
partial assignments improperly fragment the claim.”  Id. at 
1090.  We looked to section 156 of the Restatement of 
Contracts for guidance and concluded that “[a]n assignment 
of a fractional part of a single and entire right against an 
obligor is operative as if the part had been a separate right.”  
Id. at 1091; Restatement (First) of Contracts § 156 (“An 
assignment of either a fractional part of a single and entire 
right against an obligor . . . is operative as to that part or 
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amount to the same extent and in the same manner as if the 
part had been a separate right.”).9   
 At the same time, we held that when the “collective 
right to the entire claim” is split, “the partial assignee may not 
maintain the original suit” unless the obligor has consented in 
order to protect the “right[] of the obligor to be free of 
successive and repeated suits growing out of the same basic 
facts.”  In re Fine Paper Litig., 632 F.2d at 1091.  When the 
obligor does not consent to these separate suits, then these 
rights are protected by the use of the joinder rules or the class 
action mechanism.  Id.  Thus, the state of Washington could 
be made a party that, unlike other class members, did “not 
have the right to opt out.”  Id.  In our case, Defendants are 
really seeking the opposite of what we said was permissible 
in Fine Paper Litigation: they want us to say that these two 
partial assignees must proceed independent of the class.    
 While Fine Paper Litigation did not address 
numerosity, we consider its reasoning instructive.  Crucially, 
we held there that a partial assignment “is operative as if the 
part had been a separate right.”  Id. at 1091.  Moreover, Fine 
Paper Litigation envisioned the class action mechanism as a 
proper tool for partial assignees to participate in the lawsuit, 
                                                 
9  Nearly identical language is found in the Second 
Restatement of Contracts, which was pending approval at the 
time of In re Fine Paper Litigation. Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 326 (“[A]n assignment of a part of a right . . . is 
operative as to that part to the same extent and in the same 
manner as if the part had been a separate right.”). 
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albeit with fewer individual rights than other claimants.  We 
agree with the District Court that, unless there is evidence that 
the class plaintiffs are seeking to artificially inflate the 
number of claimants, partial assignees may properly be 
treated as class members.  On remand, the District Court will 
need to consider whether the three new assignees that 
Plaintiffs first mention on appeal should be considered as 
class members.10  Thus, at this point, we assume that the class 
consists of twenty-two members.   
  2.  Impracticability of Joinder 
 In Marcus, we recognized the three core purposes of 
the numerosity requirement: 
                                                 
10 Although normally “Rule 23(a)(1) does not require a 
plaintiff to offer direct evidence of the exact number and 
identities of the class members,” Marcus v. BMW of N.A., 
LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 596 (3d Cir. 2012), when the number of 
class members is so small that any deviation may impact the 
district court’s numerosity analysis, plaintiffs must provide 
evidence of each class member’s identity or risk having that 
member not counted.  The declaration of the settlement 
administrator that there are three more class members is not 
enough in this case, where we are at the low end of what is 
deemed to be a sufficient number of class members.  This is 
particularly true where all assignees – partial or otherwise – 
are large corporations whose identity is easily ascertainable.  
On remand, Plaintiffs will need to provide more evidence 
concerning these three potential class members if they wish to 
have them counted for numerosity purposes.   
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First, it ensures judicial economy.  It does so by 
freeing federal courts from the onerous rule of 
compulsory joinder inherited from the English 
Courts of Chancery and the law of equity.   
Courts no longer have to conduct a single, 
administratively burdensome action with all 
interested parties compelled to join and be 
present.  The impracticability of joinder, or 
numerosity, requirement also promotes judicial 
economy by sparing courts the burden of having 
to decide numerous, sufficiently similar 
individual actions seriatim.  As for its second 
objective, Rule 23(a)(1) creates greater access 
to judicial relief, particularly for those persons 
with claims that would be uneconomical to 
litigate individually.  Finally, the rule prevents 
putative class representatives and their counsel, 
when joinder can be easily accomplished, from 
unnecessarily depriving members of a small 
class of their right to a day in court to 
adjudicate their own claims. 
687 F.3d at 594-95 (internal citations omitted).  However, in 
Marcus, we had no need to provide a list of factors that 
should be considered in the numerosity analysis, because it 
was “[m]ere speculation” that anyone other than the named 
plaintiff was a class member.  Id. at 596-97.   
   
 We have not had occasion to list relevant factors that 
are appropriate for district court judges to consider when 
determining whether joinder would be impracticable.  We do 
so now.  This non-exhaustive list includes: judicial economy, 
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the claimants’ ability and motivation to litigate as joined 
plaintiffs, the financial resources of class members, the 
geographic dispersion of class members, the ability to identify 
future claimants, and whether the claims are for injunctive 
relief or for damages.  See 5 Moore’s Federal Practice 
§ 23.22; 5 Newberg on Class Actions § 3.12 (“These factors 
include: judicial economy arising from avoidance of a 
multiplicity of actions, geographic dispersion of class 
members, size of individual claims, financial resources of 
class members, and the ability of claimants to institute 
individual suits.”); Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Sys., 772 F.3d at 
120 (“However, the numerosity inquiry is not strictly 
mathematical but must take into account the context of the 
particular case, in particular whether a class is superior to 
joinder based on other relevant factors including: (i) judicial 
economy, (ii) geographic dispersion, (iii) the financial 
resources of class members, (iv) their ability to sue 
separately, and (v) requests for injunctive relief that would 
involve future class members.” (citing Robidoux, 987 F.2d at 
936)).   
 These factors are only relevant to a binary choice at 
the certification stage: a class action versus joinder of all 
interested parties.  At this point, we do not consider the 
possibility that plaintiffs may bring individual suits.  After all, 
the text of Rule 23(a)(1) refers to whether “the class is so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,”11 not 
                                                 
11 The superiority analysis required under Rule 23(b)(3) 
similarly calls for an inquiry into judicial economy and places 
great weight on whether the individual members can bring 
their own claims.  However, superiority, unlike numerosity, 
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whether the class is so numerous that failing to certify 
presents the risk of many separate lawsuits.    
 While all factors are relevant, we note at the outset that 
not all are created equal.  Instead, both judicial economy and 
the ability to litigate as joined parties are of primary 
importance.  As we have held, judicial economy is one of the 
purposes behind Rule 23(a)(1) and class actions in general.  
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594.  The same is true of ensuring that 
small-value claims have a mechanism by which they can be 
economically litigated.  Id.; Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank, 
                                                                                                             
considers alternatives to class actions other than joinder.  See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring an inquiry into whether “a 
class action is superior to other available methods for fairly 
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy”); In re Warfarin 
Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 533-34 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“The superiority requirement ‘asks the court to balance, in 
terms of fairness and efficiency, the merits of a class action 
against those of alternative available methods of 
adjudication.’” (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales 
Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 316 (3d Cir. 
1998))); id. at 534 (finding superiority to be satisfied because 
“there are a potentially large number of class members in this 
matter . . . . [and] each consumer has a very small claim in 
relation to the cost of prosecuting a lawsuit.  Thus, from the 
consumers’ standpoint, a class action facilitates spreading of 
the litigation costs among the numerous injured parties and 
encourages private enforcement of the statutes.”).  
Numerosity, of course, is a prerequisite to all class actions, 
while a finding of superiority is necessary only in a (b)(3) 
suit.   
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Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“Where it 
is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the 
traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual 
suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any 
effective redress unless they may employ the class action 
device.”).  If we were to say that judicial economy and the 
ability of class members to bring their own suits as named 
parties weighed in favor of class certification, how could the 
other factors outweigh these considerations even though the 
core purposes of a class action were being advanced?12  In 
this case, the District Court’s judicial economy analysis was 
incorrect, as it improperly placed great weight on the late 
stage of the proceeding.  Additionally, the District Court did 
not fully explore the ability of class members to join as 
plaintiffs.   
   a.  Judicial Economy  
  Judicial economy, a primary factor frequently cited, 
looks to the administrative burden that multiple or aggregate 
claims place upon the courts.  Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594 
(stating that the numerosity requirement “also promotes 
judicial economy by sparing the courts the burden of having 
                                                 
12 The third purpose behind class actions mentioned in 
Marcus, the due process concern of protecting the ability of 
individual members to bring their own claims, Marcus, 687 
F.3d at 594-95, is not present in Rule 23(b)(3) actions where 
members have the right to opt out of the class and where the 
identity of all class members is ascertainable such that there 
will be no difficulties in ensuring that they receive notice of 
the representative action.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v).   
 35 
 
to decide numerous, sufficiently similar individual actions 
seriatim”); id. (“Courts no longer have to conduct a single, 
administratively burdensome action with all interested parties 
compelled to join and be present.”).  This factor takes into 
account any efficiency considerations regarding the joinder of 
all interested parties that the district court deems relevant, 
including the number of parties and the nature of the action.  
See 5 Moore’s Federal Practice § 23.22 (instructing a court 
to consider “the actual, practical difficulties of joining all of 
the potential class members” by inquiring whether joinder 
“would be expensive, time-consuming, and logistically 
unfeasible”).  In analyzing judicial economy, we focus on 
whether the class action mechanism is substantially more 
efficient than joinder of all parties.   
 Here, the District Court “conclude[d] that judicial 
economy [was] best served by trying this case as a class 
action.”  King Drug Co., 309 F.R.D. at 206.  It made this 
decision by looking to “the extensive history of the litigation 
and the exhaustive discovery that ha[d] been conducted.”  Id.  
It expressed concern that further discovery would delay the 
case even more, or that unnamed class members would opt to 
file suit elsewhere, resulting in other civil actions with 
additional discovery and the potential for inconsistent 
verdicts.  Id. at 206-07 (“Joinder of the absent class members 
would likely require additional rounds of discovery, which 
would only further delay a trial date.  Further, if cases were 
brought within other jurisdictions, additional discovery is 
certainly a possibility.”).13   While these predictions may 
                                                 
13 The dissent does not “read the District Court’s analysis [of 
the judicial economy factor] as turning upon a consideration 
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come true, the late stage of litigation is not by itself an 
appropriate consideration to take into account as part of a 
numerosity analysis.14  
 In complex cases such as this antitrust suit, the class 
certification decision is often delayed until after years of fact 
and expert discovery have been conducted and dispositive 
motions have been litigated.  See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 
F.3d at 324 (“But even with some limits on discovery and the 
extent of the hearing, the district judge must receive enough 
evidence, by affidavits, documents, or testimony, to be 
satisfied that each Rule 23 requirement has been met.” 
(quoting In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 
                                                                                                             
of the late stage of the proceeding.”  However, this analysis 
consisted of three sentences in a single paragraph, each of 
which focused on the late stage of the proceeding.  King Drug 
Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 309 F.R.D. 195, 206-
07 (E.D. Pa. 2015).  We also note that the District Court’s 
entire numerosity section spanned three pages, one of which 
is nothing more than a summary of the parties’ arguments. 
 
14 The dissent cites several cases that it claims “recognize that 
it is appropriate for courts to consider the stage of the 
proceedings when weighing judicial economy.”  None of 
these cases are class actions though, which we again 
emphasize are the “exception to the usual rule that litigation 
is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties 
only.”  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 
(2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 
(1979)). 
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41 (2d Cir. 2006))).  Courts routinely refuse to certify classes 
based on the need to conduct further discovery before being 
able to properly rule on a class certification motion.  See In re 
New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litig., 522 
F.3d 6, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that the district court 
erred in preliminarily certifying the class because of the 
“novelty and complexity of the theories advanced and the 
gaps in the evidence proffered”); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva 
Pharm., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1192 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he 
record needed to decide [the class certification] issue remains 
incomplete because the district court improperly denied 
Abbott’s request to conduct so-called ‘downstream 
discovery.’”).  However, such decisions do not prejudice a 
plaintiff; the class certification motion is not denied, but only 
deferred until after further discovery is conducted.  
 Conversely, a rule that would allow courts to consider 
the late stage of litigation and the sunk costs already incurred 
in their numerosity analyses would place a thumb on the scale 
in favor of a numerosity finding for no reason other than the 
fact that the complex nature of a case resulted in the class 
certification decision being deferred for years.  Our view is 
consistent with the 2003 amendments to Rule 23(c)(1)(A) 
which state that the class certification decision should be 
made “a[t] an early practicable time after a person sues or is 
sued as a class representative” as opposed to the previous rule 
which said that the decision be made “as soon as practicable 
after commencement of an action.”  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 
advisory committee’s notes to 2003 amendment (noting that 
the “as soon as practicable” designation does not “capture[] 
the many valid reasons that may justify deferring the initial 
certification decision”).  We have recognized that the rule 
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was modified in order to discourage “premature certification 
determinations.”  Richardson v. Bledsoe, __F.3d__, 2016 WL 
3854216, at *4 (3d Cir. July 15, 2016) (quoting Weiss v. 
Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 347 (3d Cir. 2004)).15  
 As the Advisory Committee noted, there are “many 
valid reasons that may justify deferring the initial certification 
decision,” including the need to conduct discovery, a 
determination of what issues would be presented at trial, and 
the defendant’s desire to “win dismissal or summary 
judgment as to the individual plaintiffs without certification 
and without binding the class that might have been certified.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 2003 
amendment.  Thus, while Rule 23(c)(1)(A) now encourages 
further discovery so that all of the information and evidence 
relevant to certification is before a district judge before she 
makes the certification decision, the District Court’s analysis 
here would seem to consider any lengthy period following the 
filing of a putative class action as weighing in favor of 
finding numerosity.  This cannot be right.  Judicial economy 
does not permit consideration of the sunk costs from past 
                                                 
15 Weiss was abrogated on other grounds by Campbell-Ewald 
Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct.663 (2016).  However, its reasoning 
concerning the impropriety of “premature certification 
decisions” was reaffirmed in Richardson, 2016 WL 3854216, 
at *4. 
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discovery and litigation, or the need to conduct further 
discovery if the class is not certified.16   
 Moreover, while the District Court expressed concern 
that “[j]oinder of the absent class members would likely 
require additional rounds of discovery,” King Drug, 309 
F.R.D. at 206, this does not mean that the litigation would 
have to begin anew for the unnamed class members.  If the 
members all opted to join the case as individual plaintiffs, the 
District Court could, in its discretion, limit discovery where 
“is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be 
obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less 
burdensome, or less expensive.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(b)(2)(C)(i).  At this point, Defendants have not shown 
what further discovery they are entitled to; they only claim 
that they are entitled to further discovery as a matter of due 
process.17  In addition, as a class, Plaintiffs have been using 
                                                 
16 The District Court also considered the effects on judicial 
economy if individual suits in separate jurisdictions would be 
filed absent class certification.  However, the text of Rule 
23(a)(1) envisions only two scenarios: joinder of all class 
members or a class action.  Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) (inquiring 
whether “joinder of all members is impracticable”).  The 
possibility of individual suits filed in separate jurisdictions is 
not a consideration that a district court should entertain in 
deciding numerosity vel non.    
 
17 In the District Court, Defendants never asked for discovery 
from unnamed class members.  Defendants claim that a 
request for discovery of unnamed class members would have 
been futile because it is highly circumscribed.  However, the 
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the same experts.  It is not clear that there would be a need for 
that to change merely because Plaintiffs would be joined as 
individual parties instead of moving forward as a class.   
 On remand, when considering the judicial economy 
factor of the numerosity analysis, the District Court should 
not take into account the sunk costs of the litigation or the 
need to further delay trial were the class not to be certified.18  
                                                                                                             
citations that they provide in support of this view make clear 
that this is merely a heightened standard, and if they could 
show a need for discovery from unnamed class members the 
District Court would allow it.  See 5 Moore’s Federal 
Practice § 33.20 (“Reasonable discovery . . . should be 
permitted from unnamed class members when the special 
circumstances of the case justify it.”); Clark v. Universal 
Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 341 (7th Cir. 1974) (“The taking 
of depositions of absent class members is – as is true of 
written interrogatories – appropriate in special 
circumstances.”).   
 
18 The dissent suggests that we proclaim this rule “without 
any citation to authority.”  Of course, our dissenting colleague 
fails to provide any citation to authority to support a contrary 
rule.  In fact, the only authorities that we can find to support 
the dissent’s position are the District Court’s opinion in this 
case, and another district court opinion from the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania upon which the District Court here 
relied, In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., No. 08-2431, 2011 
WL 3563385, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2011).  This is a 
matter of first impression for any court of appeals.  Indeed, 
our Court has never even identified the factors that a district 
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In other words, without considering the late stage of the 
litigation, it should determine whether a class action would 
have been a substantially more efficient mechanism of 
litigating this suit than joinder of all parties.  This primarily 
involves considerations of docket control, taking into account 
practicalities as simple as that of every attorney making an 
appearance on the record.  At the same time, the District 
Court is free to rely on its superior understanding of how the 
case has proceeded to date for the purpose of determining 
whether the class mechanism would have actually been a 
substantially more efficient use of judicial resources than 
joinder of the parties at the onset of the litigation. 
b.  Ability and Motivation to be Joined as 
Plaintiffs 
 The second purpose behind the numerosity 
requirement is to further the broader class action goal of 
providing those with small claims reasonable access to a 
                                                                                                             
court should consider in its numerosity analysis despite the 
dissent’s assertion that the District Court in this case 
“properly considered every factor we have ever held to be 
relevant” in this analysis.  We cannot abdicate our 
responsibility to conduct a de novo review of legal issues.  
See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 
312 (3d Cir. 2008) (recognizing that although class 
certification decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, 
“[w]hether an incorrect legal standard has been used is an 
issue of law to be reviewed de novo” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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judicial forum for the resolution of those claims.  Thus, the 
ability and motivation of Plaintiffs to pursue their litigation 
via joinder is the second factor upon which we focus.  See 
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594 (stating that the numerosity 
requirement “creates greater access to judicial relief, 
particularly for those persons with claims that would be 
uneconomical to litigate individually”).19    
 This primarily20 involves an examination of the stakes 
at issue for the individual claims and the complexity of the 
litigation, which will typically correlate with the costs of 
pursuing these claims.  Though joinder is certainly more 
                                                 
19 We read Marcus’s language about the ability “to litigate 
individually,” Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594, to refer to each 
plaintiff appearing on the record as a joined party, and not 
whether each individual plaintiff can litigate his or her own 
claim as the sole plaintiff.  While the latter concern is 
certainly a policy justification for the class device generally, 
as we emphasize, Rule 23(a)(1) requires only the binary 
choice between class actions and joinder of all parties.   
 
20 Other considerations may be relevant to a district court in 
determining class members’ ability and motivation to be 
joined as named plaintiffs.  For example, the District Court 
here recognized that a fear of retaliation may hinder the 
ability and motivation of a party to appear as a named 
plaintiff.  In this case, the District Court noted that there was 
no proof of any fear of retaliation, and we do not disturb that 
factual finding on appeal.  King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. 
Cephalon, Inc., 309 F.R.D. 195, 207 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 
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economical for most plaintiffs than pursuing the case alone, it 
is often still uneconomical for an individual with a negative 
value claim to join a lawsuit.21 After all, each plaintiff may 
need to hire his own counsel to protect his individual interests 
– although total litigation costs would still likely be lower due 
to joint litigation agreements.  Similarly, each plaintiff would 
be subject to discovery, whereas the defendants would have 
to show a greater need for discovery from unnamed plaintiffs 
in a class action.22  See Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 
F.2d 324, 340-41 (7th Cir. 1974) (placing the burden on 
defendants to show the need for discovery from unnamed 
class members to ensure that the discovery is not requested 
“as a tactic to take undue advantage of the class members or 
as a stratagem to reduce the number of claimants” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).   
 The District Court did not properly consider this 
factor, as it focused instead on whether the individual 
                                                 
21 A negative value claim is a “claim[] that could not be 
brought on an individual basis because the transaction costs 
of bringing an individual action exceed the potential relief.”  
In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 179 (3d Cir. 
2013).   
 
22 While discovery from joined parties is not subject to the 
heightened discovery standard of unnamed class members, 
even in a non-class action a district court has the discretion to 
limit unnecessary discovery pursuant to Rule 26(b)(C).   
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plaintiffs could have brought their own, individual suits.23  
However, the numerosity rule does not envision the 
                                                 
23 The dissent contends that we misread the District Court’s 
analysis, and argues that “the focus of the District Court’s 
opinion is on joinder throughout.”  Yet every reference to 
joinder that the dissent cites comes from portions of the 
District Court opinion that were not about the ability of the 
plaintiffs to litigate via joinder.  Instead, these references are: 
“[j]oinder of the absent class members would likely require 
additional rounds of discovery,” which appears in the judicial 
economy section; “[t]he considerable geographic dispersion 
of the parties would certainly present challenges to plaintiffs 
in attempting to coordinate the litigation if all class members 
were joined,” which obviously is in the geographic dispersion 
section; and “Plaintiffs have demonstrated by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the parties are sufficiently 
numerous so as to make joinder impracticable,” which is in 
the conclusion of the numerosity analysis.  Even a cursory 
look at the section on the ability and incentive of the class 
members to litigate reveals that the District Court was 
focused on the alternative of individual suits, not on joinder.  
See King Drug, 309 F.R.D. at 207 (“Two factors that may 
weigh against Plaintiffs are the financial resources of the class 
members and the parties’ abilities to bring individual suits.”) 
(emphasis added); id. (“These prospective class members 
likely do not have the same incentive to engage in costly 
antitrust litigation on their own.”) (emphasis added).  To the 
extent that the District Court did properly consider the 
alternative of joinder, as the dissent contends, on remand the 
District Court has the opportunity to more clearly state this 
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alternative of individual suits; it considers only the alternative 
of joinder.  Here, the class members, based on the record 
before us, appear likely to have the ability and incentive to 
bring suit as joined parties, thus preventing the alleged 
wrongdoers from escaping liability.24  In fact, three class 
                                                                                                             
when it conducts its rigorous numerosity analysis.  At this 
point, the references to “individual suits” and “on their own” 
prominently stand out when surrounded by the references to 
“joinder” in the other sections.    
 
24 Most of the dissent’s possible reasons why the class 
members would not be likely to join as named plaintiffs – 
“desire to have one’s self and own law firm control the 
litigation, choice of favorable forum, familiarity with the 
local jurisdictions laws and procedures, [and] fear of being 
dragged into settlement” – are equally applicable to the 
decision of whether to opt out of the class.  See Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 813 (1985) (discussing 
the importance of allowing opt outs because if a “plaintiff’s 
claim is sufficiently large or important that he wishes to 
litigate it on his own, he will likely have retained an attorney 
or have thought about filing suit, and should be fully capable 
of exercising his right to ‘opt out’”).  Moreover, these reasons 
do not show why joinder is “impracticable”; they simply 
show that joinder may not be the preferred method of 
proceeding with the case.  If a plaintiff wants to proceed 
individually, it has that choice.  The plaintiff does not need to 
join the suit – just as it need not remain a member of a 
certified class – if it wants to control its own litigation, 
choose a more favorable forum, select a jurisdiction whose 
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members, none of whom are named plaintiffs, each have 
claims estimated at over $1 billion – even before the trebling 
of damages.  These three make up over 97% of the total value 
of the class claims, and can hardly be considered as 
candidates who need the aggregative advantages of the class 
device.  While this factor could weigh in favor of class status 
if the remaining class members had very small claims, that is 
simply not the case here.  Thirteen of the other nineteen class 
members have claims that are greater than $1 million, the 
value that the two parties seem to agree is the appropriate 
figure at which point bringing one’s own suit becomes 
economical.  On the other hand, there are only six class 
members with claims below $1 million each.  While it may be 
uneconomical for these claims to be pursued in individual 
litigation, there has been no showing that it would be 
uneconomical for these six class members to be individually 
joined as parties in a traditional lawsuit.  On remand, the 
District Court should consider this issue.  Even if it were 
uneconomical for some or all of these six individual plaintiffs 
to join the suit, the District Court must still determine 
whether, considering all the other relevant factors, class status 
– which is “an exception to the usual rule that litigation is 
                                                                                                             
laws and procedures it is familiar with, or avoid being 
dragged into a settlement.  Cf. In re Diet Drugs Prods. 
Liability Litig., 369 F.3d 293, 308 (3d Cir. 2004) (“By 
waiving an initial opt-out, the class member surrenders what 
may be valuable rights, in return for countervailing 
benefits.”).   
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conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties 
only,” Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 348 – is appropriate here. 
 The District Court abused its discretion in analyzing 
the two most important numerosity factors when it considered 
the late stage of the litigation as relevant to the judicial 
economy factor and failed to properly consider the ability and 
motivation of the plaintiffs to proceed as joined, as opposed 
to individual, parties.  We therefore remand for the District 
Court to conduct a rigorous numerosity analysis for this class 
of twenty-two (or twenty-five) members.  In conducting this 
rigorous analysis, factors that the District Court may consider 
include the financial resources of the class members, the 
geographic dispersion of the class members, the ability to 
identify future claimants, together with the fact that these 
claims are for damages, and not injunctive relief.   
 Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, we are not 
“erecting roadblocks that do not exist.”  Although the dissent 
suggests that Defendants have not yet shown why joinder is 
practicable, that suggestion is beside the point.  The burden is 
on Plaintiffs to show why joinder is impracticable.  Marcus, 
687 F.3d at 591 (“The party seeking certification bears the 
burden of establishing each element of Rule 23” – including 
the numerosity requirement – “by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”); id. at 595 (“Critically, numerosity—like all Rule 
23 requirements—must be proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”).  Moreover, the dissent would have Defendants’ 
inability to articulate an argument against finding numerosity 
obviate a district court’s obligation to conduct “a rigorous 
analysis” and determine “that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) 
have been satisfied.”  Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 351 (internal 
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quotation marks omitted); Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 
310 (“[A] class may not be certified without a finding that 
each Rule 23 requirement is met.”). 
 Finally, the dissent makes the extravagant claim that 
“nothing about [this case] cries out for anything but class 
treatment.”  Yet this is not the typical class action where 
hundreds or thousands of claims are aggregated in order to 
ensure that the wrongdoer is held accountable and that small 
claims are vindicated.  See Thorogood, 547 F.3d at 744.  
Putting aside the small number of class members in this case, 
the judges in the majority have never seen a class action 
where three class members, each with billions of dollars at 
stake and close to 100% of the total value of class claims 
between them, have been allowed to sit on the sidelines as 
unnamed class members.  Plaintiffs must satisfy their burden 
of showing why we should allow this unique putative class to 
take advantage of this “exception to the usual rule that 
litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual 
named parties only.”  Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 348 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  At this point, they have failed to 
meet that burden, and any suggestion that this is a run-of-the-
mill class action ignores the facts of this case.25   
                                                 
25 The dissent makes the argument that if the class were not 
certified, then several individual judges would have to 
address what it terms “the real issues before the Court.”  Yet 
the only other issue before the Court is the Comcast 
predominance issue.  If the class were not certified because of 
a failure to satisfy the numerosity requirement, there would 
be no Comcast argument, as predominance is a question that 
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 B.  Predominance.   
 Although we remand for the District Court to 
reconsider its numerosity analysis, we also see a need to 
address Defendants’ predominance argument.  This argument 
makes selective use of language from the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 
(2013).  The interpretation of Comcast advanced by 
Defendants is overly broad and simplistic, and, if the class 
were to meet the numerosity requirement on remand, the 
predominance argument advanced by Defendants is 
untenable.     
 Under Rule 23(b)(3), “questions of law or fact 
common to class members [must] predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members.”26  This 
“inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently 
cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.”  Amchem 
Prods., 521 U.S. at 623.  “If anything, Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
predominance criterion is even more demanding than Rule 
23(a),” Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432, as it is “[f]ramed for 
situations in which ‘class-action treatment is not as clearly 
                                                                                                             
arises only in the class action context.  Additionally, the fact 
that there is a “key issue” that the parties seek to litigate does 
not justify class status.   
 
26 Rule 23(b)(3) also states that “a class action [must be] 
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.”  This second requirement – 
superiority – is not at issue in this appeal.   
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called for’ as it is in Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) situations.”  
Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 615 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 
advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment).  This 
“inquiry is especially dependent upon the merits of a 
plaintiff’s claim, since the nature of the evidence that will 
suffice to resolve a question determines whether the question 
is common or individual.”  In re Constar Int’l Inc. Sec. Litig., 
585 F.3d 774, 780 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  The Supreme Court has noted that “[a]n individual 
question is one where members of a proposed class will need 
to present evidence that varies from member to member, 
while a common question is one where the same evidence 
will suffice for each member to make a prima facie showing 
[or] the issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.”  
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 
(2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 The predominance requirement applies to damages as 
well, because the efficiencies of the class action mechanism 
would be negated if “[q]uestions of individual damage 
calculations . . . overwhelm questions common to the class.”  
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433.  This does not mean, however, 
that damages must be “susceptible of measurement across the 
entire class for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3).”  Neale v. Volvo 
Cars of N.A., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 374 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the 
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).  They make two 
interrelated arguments: (1) Plaintiffs’ theory of liability runs 
afoul of Comcast because, after the grant of summary 
judgment on the global conspiracy claim, Plaintiffs’ damages 
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model no longer corresponds to their remaining theory of 
liability that there were four independent Section 1 
conspiracies; and (2) predominance cannot be demonstrated 
because Plaintiffs’ remaining theory of liability must isolate 
the harm that each individual reverse-payment settlement 
agreement caused each individual class member under the 
doctrine of antitrust standing.27   
  1.  Comcast Argument   
 Comcast was an antitrust suit brought by a class of 
Comcast subscribers.  The plaintiffs initially had four theories 
                                                 
27 Plaintiffs argue that we should exercise our pendent 
appellate jurisdiction and review the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment on the global antitrust conspiracy claim 
because reversal on this claim would moot the Comcast issue.  
The use of the pendent appellate jurisdiction doctrine “is an 
exercise of discretion by a Court of Appeals and should be 
used sparingly.”  United States v. Spears, 859 F.2d 284, 287 
(3d Cir. 1988).  If we were to reverse on the Comcast issue, 
we would deem it prudent to examine the global antitrust 
conspiracy claim.  However, because we would affirm on 
predominance grounds, we do not deem the class certification 
order and the summary judgment order to be so “inextricably 
intertwined” that the exercise of our pendent appellate 
jurisdiction would be appropriate.  CTF Hotel Holdings, Inc. 
v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 381 F.3d 131, 136 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Accordingly, we express 
no view on the merits of Plaintiffs’ global antitrust conspiracy 
claim.   
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of antitrust impact: (1) “Comcast’s clustering made it 
profitable for Comcast to withhold local sports programming 
from its competitors”; (2) “Comcast’s activities reduced the 
level of competition from ‘overbuilders’”; (3) “Comcast 
reduced the level of ‘benchmark’ competition on which cable 
customers rely to compare prices”; and (4) “clustering 
increased Comcast’s bargaining power relative to content 
providers.”  133 S. Ct. at 1430-31.  Their damages model “did 
not isolate damages resulting from any one theory of antitrust 
impact,” id. at 1431, and simply “assumed the validity of all 
four theories of antitrust impact,” id. at 1434.  The district 
court limited its certification order to the overbuilding theory 
because it was the only antitrust theory capable of classwide 
proof, but found the predominance requirement to be satisfied 
even though the damages model was not altered to reflect the 
only theory of harm remaining.  Id. at 1431.  A divided panel 
of our Court affirmed, Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 
182 (3d Cir. 2011), with Judge Jordan writing separately to 
say that he “would vacate the certification order to the extent 
it provides for a single class as to proof of damages,” id. at 
209 (Jordan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part), because the model of plaintiffs’ expert “no 
longer fits Plaintiffs’ sole theory of antitrust impact, and, 
instead, produces damages calculations that are not the certain 
result of the wrong,” id. at 217 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while the 
damages model does not need to be exact, “a model 
purporting to serve as evidence of damages in [a] class action 
must measure only those damages attributable to that theory.  
If the model does not even attempt to do that, it cannot 
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possibly establish that damages are susceptible of 
measurement across the entire class for purposes of Rule 
23(b)(3).”  Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433.  Because the 
plaintiffs’ damages model reflected injury from all four 
alleged antitrust violations, and because only the overbuilding 
theory of harm remained, the damages model was unable to 
“bridge the differences between supra-competitive prices in 
general and supra-competitive prices attributable to the 
deterrence of overbuilding.”  Id. at 1435.  The Supreme Court 
explained “[p]rices whose level above what an expert deems 
‘competitive’ has been caused by factors unrelated to an 
accepted theory of antitrust harm are not ‘anticompetitive’ in 
any sense relevant here.”  Id.    
 In the case before us, Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Leitzinger, 
created a damages model that calculated the savings to the 
class if generic entry had occurred earlier.  He noted the 
prices and overcharges actually paid by the class members 
and compared that to but-for worlds that included the launch 
of anywhere between one and five generic competitors.  
Crucially, this model did not allocate damages amongst the 
five original defendants (Cephalon and the four generic 
manufacturers), attribute a certain amount of harm from each 
individual reverse-payment settlement, or identify which class 
members were harmed by which reverse-payment settlement.  
In Defendants’ view, because only individual conspiracies 
remain, any damages model must reflect the harm caused by 
each individual conspiracy to each individual class member, 
and the use of the same damages model that envisioned a 
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global conspiracy “does not even attempt,” Id. at 1433, to 
correspond to this remaining theory of liability.28   
 However, Plaintiffs’ theory of liability is not that each 
individual agreement caused an individual harm, such that a 
new damages model would be required under Comcast.  
Instead, their theory of liability is that each individual 
agreement contributed to the market-wide harm, and that all 
five original defendants are jointly and severally liable29 for 
this harm as concurrent tortfeasors.  This theory may 
ultimately be proven wrong, but it does match Plaintiffs’ 
damages theory.  Defendants next try to argue that Plaintiffs’ 
theory of liability must isolate the harm from each individual 
                                                 
28 Defendants have not challenged the substance of Dr. 
Leitzinger’s methodology.   
 
29 Under the doctrine of joint and several liability, “[i]f the 
tortious conduct of each of two or more persons is a legal 
cause of harm that cannot be apportioned, each is subject to 
liability for the entire harm, irrespective of whether their 
conduct is concurring or consecutive.”  Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 879 (1979); United States v. Alcan Aluminum 
Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268 (3d Cir. 1992) (applying the 
doctrine of joint and several liability to an environmental 
statute when the harm was indivisible amongst the 
tortfeasors).  The Third Restatement of Torts provides no 
guidance.  Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of 
Liability § 17 (stating that “the law of the applicable 
jurisdiction determines whether” whether concurrent 
tortfeasors “are jointly and severally liable”). 
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agreement, and that any reliance on joint and several liability 
conflicts with the requirements of antitrust standing.   
  2.  Antitrust Impact 
 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are attempting to 
circumvent the doctrine of antitrust standing by asserting the 
theory of joint and several liability.  In essence, they are 
arguing that the joint and several theory of liability is not 
“plausible in theory,” Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 325, 
because under the doctrine of antitrust standing Plaintiffs 
must show how each individual agreement harmed each 
individual class member.     
 In an antitrust class action, “impact often is critically 
important for the purpose of evaluating Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
predominance requirement because it is an element of the 
claim that may call for individual, as opposed to common, 
proof.”  Id. at 311.  A district court must thus undertake a 
“rigorous assessment of the available evidence and the 
method or methods by which plaintiffs propose to use the 
evidence to prove impact at trial.”  Id. at 312.  The class 
should only be certified “if such impact is plausible in theory 
[and] it is also susceptible to proof at trial through available 
evidence common to the class.”  Id. at 325.  This inquiry 
often involves an overlap into the merits.  Id. at 324.   
 Defendants argue that, in the absence of the global 
conspiracy claim, Plaintiffs must prove which class members 
suffered an injury under a specific bilateral agreement.  They 
state that under the doctrine of antitrust standing, a class 
member who would have purchased generic modafinil from 
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Ranbaxy cannot hold Mylan liable; a class member who 
would have purchased generic modafinil from Mylan cannot 
hold Ranbaxy liable; and a class member who would have 
purchased generic modafinil from Teva cannot hold either 
Ranbaxy or Mylan liable.  If correct, such individualized 
inquiries would defeat predominance, and Plaintiffs’ joint and 
several liability theory would not be plausible.  We agree with 
the general proposition that an antitrust plaintiff cannot defeat 
the doctrine of antitrust standing by resort to common-law 
tort principles untethered to antitrust law.  But Defendants’ 
objection is misplaced in this case because the common law 
principle of joint and several liability is being invoked by 
Plaintiffs for the proper purpose of establishing antitrust 
impact and therefore antitrust standing.   
 The doctrine of antitrust standing requires a plaintiff to 
“prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence 
in the market.”  Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 
429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).30  This inquiry instead looks to 
whether the plaintiff suffered an antitrust injury, i.e., an 
                                                 
30 Antitrust standing, unlike Article III standing, is not a 
jurisdictional requirement.  Associated Gen. Contractors of 
Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 
535 n.31 (1983) (“Harm to the antitrust plaintiff is sufficient 
to satisfy the constitutional standing requirement of injury in 
fact, but the court must make a further determination whether 
the plaintiff is a proper party to bring a private antitrust 
action.”); Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Labs., 707 F.3d 
223, 232 (3d Cir. 2013) (describing antitrust standing as a 
prudential limitation that “does not affect the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the court, as Article III standing does”). 
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“injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent 
and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts 
unlawful.”  Id.  In Associated General Contractors of 
California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters 
(AGC), 459 U.S. 519, 537-38 (1983), the Supreme Court 
stated that many factors go into this determination.  We have 
condensed these factors into a multi-part test: 
(1) the causal connection between the antitrust 
violation and the harm to the plaintiff and the 
intent by the defendant to cause that harm, with 
neither factor alone conferring standing; (2) 
whether the plaintiff’s alleged injury is of the 
type for which the antitrust laws were intended 
to provide redress; (3) the directness of the 
injury, which addresses the concerns that liberal 
application of standing principles might 
produce speculative claims; (4) the existence of 
more direct victims of the alleged antitrust 
violations; and (5) the potential for duplicative 
recovery or complex apportionment of 
damages. 
Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Labs., 707 F.3d 223, 232-33 
(3d Cir. 2013) (quoting In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore 
Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1165-66 (3d Cir. 1993)).  We 
have said that the “directness of injury” is “the focal point by 
which the remainder of the AGC factors are guided.”  Lower 
Lake Erie, 998 F.2d at 1166 n.19 (citing Holmes v. Sec. 
Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269 (1992)).   
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 Defendants rely solely on a pre-AGC case of ours, 
Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 
F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979), which concerned the “all-important[] 
directness factor,” in support of their position that Plaintiffs 
lack antitrust standing to bring claims against generic 
manufacturers from whom they would not have purchased.  
Lower Lake Erie, 998 F.2d at 1167-68 (conducting an 
analysis of the AGC factors and discussing Midwest-Paper in 
the directness of injury section).31  In Mid-West Paper, the 
plaintiff claimed that it “suffered as a direct purchaser of 
consumer bags from competitors of the defendants, who 
allegedly were able to charge artificially inflated prices as a 
consequence of defendants’ price-fixing.”  596 F.2d at 580 
(footnote omitted).  We held that the plaintiff, who was not a 
customer of any member of the conspiracy, lacked antitrust 
standing to sue the conspiracy members even though it paid 
higher prices as a result of the conspiracy.  In other words, the 
customer of a competitor of conspiracy members was not 
“one whose protection is the fundamental purpose of the 
antitrust laws.”  Id. at 583 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 In reaching this conclusion in Mid-West Paper, we 
took several factors into consideration.  First, we noted that it 
would be “almost impossible, and at the very least unwieldy” 
to calculate the harm to the plaintiff from the conspiracy, 
because so many variables went into the competitor’s price 
                                                 
31 Because the parties only dispute the relevance of Mid-West 
Paper and the “directness” factor, and we reject Defendants’ 
understanding of Mid-West Paper, we will not analyze the 
other factors of antitrust standing. 
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calculation irrespective of the existence of the monopoly.  Id. 
at 584.  The value of any harm caused by the anticompetitive 
conduct would be speculative and “would transform this 
antitrust litigation into the sort of complex economic 
proceeding” that the direct-purchaser rule32 was adopted in 
part to prevent.  Id. at 585.  In addition, the defendants were 
“not in a direct or immediate relationship” to the plaintiff, and 
they gained no advantage from the plaintiff’s injury.  Id. at 
583.  Moreover, there was another group of victims who were 
more likely to sue the conspiracy members – those who 
purchased directly from them – and one of the purposes of the 
antitrust standing doctrine is to “compensate[] those victims 
who are most likely to assume the mantle of private attorneys 
general for the injuries that they suffered.”  Id. at 585. For 
that reason, we “concentrate[] the entire award in the hands of 
the direct purchasers in all but unusual circumstances and 
thereby giv[e] them an incentive to sue.”  Id.  If we were to 
allow the customer of a competitor to sue for treble damages 
when the “causal link to defendants’ activities is [so] 
tenuous,” it would “subject antitrust violators to potentially 
ruinous liabilities, well in excess of their illegally-earned 
profits, because . . . [violators] would be held accountable for 
higher prices that arguably ensued in the entire industry.”  Id. 
at 586.   
                                                 
32 The direct-purchaser rule states that only immediate 
customers of a supplier have antitrust standing to sue for 
damages as customers even if the direct purchaser passes the 
entirety of the higher price down the supply chain.  Illinois 
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) 
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 As is clear from the above description, Defendants’ 
argument that Mid-West Paper means that a customer of a 
non-defendant cannot have antitrust standing is an 
oversimplification.  Mid-West Paper reached its result 
because it wanted to ensure that only those who are most 
directly harmed by the anticompetitive conduct can sue to 
remedy the antitrust violation.  When, as in Mid-West Paper, 
the anticompetitive conduct is price-fixing, the only 
customers who will have antitrust standing are the direct 
customers of the conspiracy members.  The case before us is 
not about price-fixing.  It is, instead, a case about market 
exclusion, as it concerns conduct that prevents a competitive 
market from forming at all.33  In such a scenario all market 
customers should have antitrust standing to sue those engaged 
in the allegedly anticompetitive conduct because all suffer 
equally from the foreclosure of choice.  See AGC, 459 U.S. at 
538 (“[T]he Sherman Act was enacted to assure customers the 
benefits of price competition, and our prior cases have 
emphasized the central interest in protecting the economic 
freedom of participants in the relevant market.”).   
 In fact, in Lower Lake Erie, we addressed market 
exclusion in the market for the unloading of iron ore from 
ships.  Traditionally, iron ore was shipped across the Great 
                                                 
33 Preventing a market from forming differs from an attempt 
to suppress competition in an established market.  See Blue 
Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 483 (1982) (stating 
that, in a conspiracy to suppress competition in the 
psychotherapy market by restricting access to psychologists 
(as opposed to psychiatrists), customers of the psychologists 
would only be indirectly injured).   
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Lakes, unloaded at railroad-owned docks onto a railroad, and 
then transported to the steel mills.  Lower Lake Erie, 998 F.2d 
at 1153-55.  Large cranes called “huletts” were affixed to the 
docks and were needed to unload the iron ore from the ships, 
and, because the non-railroad-owned docks were not 
equipped with huletts, they “were not competitors for this 
segment of the ore business.”  Id. at 1153.  A new, less 
expensive technology was developed that would allow the 
iron ore to be unloaded without the use of huletts, and thus 
open the transshipment market to non-railroad-owned docks.  
Id.  The railroad companies suppressed this new technology 
by threatening non-railroad-owned docks with higher rates, 
among other measures.  Id.   
 The issue of antitrust standing arose when the steel 
companies sued the railroad companies for higher rates paid 
to the vessel companies.  Id. at 1167.  We held that this injury 
was sufficiently direct, despite the railroad company’s 
reliance on Mid-West Paper.  Specifically, we noted that even 
though the steel companies paid higher rates than it otherwise 
would have to several ore transportation companies – both 
defendants and non-defendants – “it was unquestionably the 
steel companies who bore the brunt of the increased costs 
attributed to the railroad’s agreement to thwart development 
of the less expensive technology.”  Id. at 1168; id. (“The steel 
companies were the sole customers of the industry involved 
in the transshipment of ore; indeed, the industry existed for 
them.”).  Although there were other victims of the harm, such 
as the vessel companies, the dock companies, and trucking 
companies, this did “not diminish the directness of the steel 
companies’ injury.”  Id. at 1168-69.    
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 Unlike in Mid-West Paper, where there was a market 
for consumer bags and we knew who was buying from whom, 
there was no market in this case due to Defendants’ allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct in delaying the availability of generic 
modafinil.  Just as the railroad docks and their older, more 
expensive technology were the steel companies’ only choice 
in Lower Lake Erie, Cephalon’s brand-name version of 
modafinil – Provigil – was the only option available to the 
DPP class.  All other options were prevented from entering 
the market by the allegedly anticompetitive conduct of the 
railroad companies and the drug manufacturers, respectively.   
 Under Plaintiffs’ theory, each of the four generic 
manufacturers allegedly entered into separate anticompetitive 
arrangements with Cephalon.34   If any one of them had 
                                                 
34 Defendants argue that either Teva – as the first company to 
settle with Cephalon – or Barr – as the last to do so – caused 
all of the injury, and that Mylan or Ranbaxy cannot be held 
liable.  While we have delved deep into the merits in order to 
opine on the predominance question, this argument by 
Defendants is inappropriate at the class certification stage.  It 
has nothing to do with whether common questions of law and 
fact predominate, and instead goes to the issue of liability.  
See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1047 
(2015) (“When, as here, ‘the concern about the proposed class 
is not that it exhibits some fatal dissimilarity but, rather, a 
fatal similarity—[an alleged] failure of proof as to an element 
of the plaintiffs’ cause of action—courts should engage that 
question as a matter of summary judgment, not class 
certification.’” (quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class 
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refused to enter into this arrangement, there would have been 
no antitrust injury for anyone, as the market would have 
worked as envisioned by the Hatch-Waxman Act: there 
would have been between one and five generic manufacturers 
competing with the brand-name modafinil during the 180-day 
exclusivity period, after which there would have been a fully 
competitive market.  However, because all four entered into 
these reverse-payment settlement agreements and prevented a 
competitive market from forming, each contributed to the 
market-wide harm, and each can be held jointly and severally 
liable for such harm.  This is not the sum of four separate 
individual harms emanating from each agreement; instead, it 
is a harm that all four agreements work jointly to produce, 
even if there was no conspiracy between the generic 
manufacturers.  The class member who would have purchased 
from Teva is harmed by the Ranbaxy and Mylan agreements 
to the same extent that a Ranbaxy or Mylan customer would 
be.  Thus, any class member would have antitrust standing to 
sue any or all of the four generic companies individually.  
There is no need to pursue an individualized inquiry into the 
harm caused by each agreement, and “questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).  
Defendants’ attempt to dictate Plaintiffs’ theory of liability 
based on the doctrine of antitrust standing should fail.   
IV.   
                                                                                                             
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 97, 107 (2009)).   
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 For the reasons stated above, we will vacate the 
District Court’s class certification order, and we will remand 
to the District Court for further consideration of whether 
joinder of all class members is impracticable.   
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In re: Modafinil Antitrust Litigation 
 
No. 15-3475 
          
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
 
 Today, the Majority concludes that the able District 
Court judge abused his discretion by purportedly focusing on 
a consideration that we have never—indeed, by my research, 
no court has ever—stated it should not consider. How can that 
be? Furthermore, how can it be that the Majority 
mischaracterizes the late stage of the proceedings as being the 
focus of Judge Goldberg’s ruling when his reasoning actually 
focuses on the considerations that our case law dictates it 
should? Also how can it be that in analyzing judicial 
economy district courts are prohibited from considering the 
stage of the proceedings? I am perplexed. I am similarly 
perplexed as to why the Majority is directing the District 
Court on remand to figure out whether joinder is practicable 
when the appellants have failed to make that case themselves. 
I therefore respectfully dissent from part III.A of the 
Majority’s opinion.  
 
The District Court Correctly Applied Rule 23(a)(1) 
 The text of Rule 23(a)(1) provides the standard by 
which a district court determines if a putative class is 
numerous enough to be certified—the district court must 
determine if “joinder of all members is impracticable.” See 
also Newberg on Class Actions § 3:11 (5th ed.) (“[Rule 
23(a)(1)’s] core requirement is that joinder be 
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impracticable.”). Because the focus of Rule 23(a)(1) is on the 
practicability of joinder, it is well-established that “[t]he 
numerosity requirement requires examination of the specific 
facts of each case and imposes no absolute limitations.” Gen. 
Tel. Co. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980); see 
also Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(“No minimum number of plaintiffs is required to maintain a 
suit as a class action . . . .”); Newberg on Class Actions § 3:11 
(“Numerousness—the presence of many class members—
provides an obvious situation in which joinder may be 
impracticable, but it is not the only such situation; thus, Rule 
23(a)(1)’s analysis may, in specific circumstances, focus on 
other factors as well.”). In examining the “specific facts of 
each case,” Gen. Tel. Co., 446 U.S. at 330, we have instructed 
courts to bear in mind the underpinnings of the numerosity 
requirement. The first of these is “judicial economy by 
sparing courts the burden of having to decide numerous, 
sufficiently similar individual actions seriatim.” Marcus v. 
BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 594 (3d Cir. 2012). The 
second is “greater access to judicial relief, particularly for 
those persons with claims that would be uneconomical to 
litigate individually.” Id.1 
 
 Here, the District Court, after making a careful finding 
that the putative class consisted of 22 members, had to make 
a close call. Our cases have recognized that “[w]hile there are 
                                              
 1 As the Majority notes, the third underpinning, to 
“prevent[] putative class representatives and their counsel, 
when joinder can be easily accomplished, from unnecessarily 
depriving members of a small class of their right to a day in 
court to adjudicate their own claims,” id., is not relevant to 
23(b)(3) actions. See Majority Op. 34 n.12.  
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exceptions, numbers under twenty-one have generally been 
held to be too few.” Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 808 
n.35 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting 3B J. Moore, Moore’s Federal 
Practice ¶ 23.05[1], at 23–150 (2d ed. 1982)). This 
recognition, however, does not stem from any mechanical 
numerical requirement, but rather from an understanding that 
the considerations bearing on the practicability of joinder are 
less likely to be met in classes with fewer than 21 members. 
See Newberg on Class Actions § 3:11 (“Numerousness—the 
presence of many class members—provides an obvious 
situation in which joinder may be impracticable, but it is not 
the only such situation; thus, Rule 23(a)(1)’s analysis may, in 
specific circumstances, focus on other factors as well.”). 
Recognizing the closeness of the issue, the District Court did 
exactly as we have instructed it to do and looked to factors 
bearing on the objectives we cited in Marcus.2 Indeed, the 
District Court examined the very factors that the Majority 
embraces: judicial economy, the geographic dispersion of 
class members, the claimants’ ability and motivation to 
litigate as joined plaintiffs, and the financial resources of 
class members.  
 
 The District Court first considered whether judicial 
economy weighs in favor of finding joinder to be 
impracticable: 
 
                                              
 2 The Majority asserts that the factors we should 
consider have not been previously set forth. But Marcus’s 
recitation of the policies that animate numerosity provides a 
helpful standard from which the factors to consider are 
readily discernible.  
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Considering the extensive history of this 
litigation and the exhaustive discovery that has 
been conducted, I conclude that judicial 
economy is best served by trying this case as a 
class action. Joinder of the absent class 
members would likely require additional rounds 
of discovery, which would only further delay a 
trial date. Further, if cases were brought within 
other jurisdictions, additional discovery is 
certainly a possibility, and separate trials could 
result in inconsistent verdicts. 
 
JA-021. The reasons cited for finding judicial economy to 
favor certification of the class are entirely appropriate. 
“Judicial economy” means “[e]fficiency in the operation of 
the courts and the judicial system; esp., the efficient 
management of litigation so as to minimize duplication of 
effort and to avoid wasting the judiciary’s time and 
resources.” Judicial Economy, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th 
ed. 2009). The District Court here noted that the additional 
discovery and potential separate trials would further delay 
litigation that was already near its end stages, wasting the 
judiciary’s time and resources and requiring the duplication 
of efforts. 
 
 The District Court next considered the geographic 
dispersion of the class members, a factor widely recognized 
as vital in determining whether joinder is practicable. See, 
e.g., Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 
772 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2014) (listing “geographic 
dispersion” as a factor in the numerosity analysis); Newberg 
on Class Actions § 3:12 (same); 7A Charles Allen Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1762 (3d 
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ed.) (same); 1 Moore’s Federal Practice § 23.22 (Matthew 
Bender 3d ed.) (same). The District Court found this factor to 
weigh heavily in favor of finding joinder impracticable, 
noting that the “class members are spread out over thirteen 
states and Puerto Rico.” JA-021. This, the District Court 
found, “would certainly present challenges to Plaintiffs in 
attempting to coordinate the litigation if all class members 
were joined, particularly if additional discovery was 
required.” JA-021. Again, this finding is certainly reasonable, 
is supported by the record, and is in accordance with our 
instructions as to the relevant considerations in the 
numerosity calculation.  
 
 Against these concerns about judicial economy and, in 
particular, geographic dispersion, the District Court 
considered that many of the class members were sophisticated 
corporations with strong incentives to bring their own 
lawsuits. But this was not true for every class member, as six 
had claims below $1 million which might not be enough 
incentive “to engage in costly antitrust litigation on their 
own.” JA-022. This wholly appropriate consideration bears 
upon the objective to provide “greater access to judicial relief, 
particularly for those persons with claims that would be 
uneconomical to litigate individually.” Marcus, 687 F.3d at 
594.  
 
 Ultimately, the District Court found the factors 
favoring the plaintiffs’ position (judicial economy and 
geographic dispersion) to be more compelling than the factor 
favoring the defendants’ position (the financial resources of 
the class members). In short, the District Court considered the 
policies we outlined in Marcus and made a thoughtful 
determination in a close case. Our abuse-of-discretion 
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standard compels us to affirm that thoughtful determination. 
Moreover, our clearly erroneous standard compels us to not 
disturb the factual findings on which it was based. 
 
The District Court Did Not Err in Considering the Stage of 
the Proceedings 
 
 The Majority, however, concludes that the District 
Court erred in its analysis of the “judicial economy” factor by 
taking into consideration the stage of the proceedings. As an 
initial note, I do not read the District Court’s analysis as 
turning solely upon a consideration of the late stage of the 
proceedings. Rather, the District Court examined many 
factors, most notably the additional discovery and judicial 
resources that would have to be expended were the cases to 
be litigated outside of the class action mechanism, regardless 
of how far advanced the classwide proceedings were.  
 
 At any rate, it is appropriate—indeed, necessary—for a 
district court to consider the stage of the proceedings when 
examining whether judicial economy favors class litigation or 
individual litigation. In considering judicial economy, a 
district judge must predict how the options before him will 
play out. This prediction becomes nonsensical, however, if 
the district judge cannot take into consideration the amount of 
effort already expended. If you want to determine whether the 
path you are following is the most economical, is it not 
important to consider how far along that path you have 
already traveled?3   
                                              
 3 The Majority’s references to “sunk costs” are inapt. 
See Majority Op. 37, 39, 40. Sunk costs are costs that have 
already incurred and cannot be recovered. See Verizon 
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 Unsurprisingly, then, courts widely—if not 
universally—recognize that it is appropriate for courts to 
consider the stage of the proceedings when weighing judicial 
economy. See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 
U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (“[A] federal court should consider and 
weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the 
values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity 
in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case 
brought in that court involving pendent state-law claims.” 
(emphasis added)); Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 
592 F.3d 412, 420-21 (3d Cir. 2010) (“However, 
considerations of efficiency, fairness, and judicial economy 
weigh against a wholesale dismissal of the action at this 
stage.” (emphasis added)); Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. 
v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 587 (5th Cir. 1992) (“At the 
stage of the proceedings when the motion was filed, judicial 
economy would have been better served by dismissal.” 
(emphasis added)); Park S. Hotel Corp. v. N.Y. Hotel Trades 
Council, 851 F.2d 578, 582 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[J]udicial 
economy would not be served by remanding the case at this 
late stage for arbitration, which almost certainly would be 
followed by further judicial proceedings.” (emphasis added)); 
United States v. Timmons, 672 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 
1982) (“The district judge appropriately considered that 
joinder would not serve the interests of judicial economy in 
                                                                                                     
Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 499 (2002) (“‘Sunk 
costs’ are unrecoverable past costs . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
The District Court’s analysis did not consider sunk costs, but 
rather the relative costs, going forward, of joinder and class 
litigation. To determine the relative costs, going forward, of 
joinder and class litigation, one needs to know how much 
remains to be done under either alternative.  
8 
 
view of the late stage of the proceedings . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 
 The Majority asserts, however, without citation to any 
authority, that a district court cannot consider “the fact that 
the complex nature of a case resulted in the class certification 
decision being deferred for years,” see Majority Op. 37, or 
“the need to further delay trial were the class not to be 
certified,” see Majority Op. 40, or even “the need to conduct 
further discovery if the class is not certified,” see Majority 
Op. 39. But these are precisely the type of practicalities—how 
long it would take, how complex it would be, how expensive 
it would be—that help determine the practicability of joinder. 
The Majority’s directive as to what a district court should 
consider turns the issue into an exercise in abstraction.4 If a 
district judge cannot consider the practicalities of cost and 
time, then judicial economy will be poorly served indeed, and 
one of the core purposes of the class action mechanism—to 
“save[] the resources of both the courts and the parties by 
                                              
 4 The Majority instructs district courts to consider 
whether, in a hypothetical world, joinder would have been 
more efficient than the class mechanism. Cf. Majority Op. 41 
(“In other words, without considering the late stage of the 
litigation, it should determine whether a class action would 
have been a substantially more efficient mechanism of 
litigating this suit than joinder of all parties. . . . At the same 
time, the District Court is free to rely on its superior 
understanding of how the case has proceeded to date for the 
purpose of determining whether the class mechanism would 
have actually been a substantially more efficient use of 
judicial resources than joinder of the parties at the onset of the 
litigation.”). 
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permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class member] 
to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23”—will 
be undercut. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 
(1979).  
 
The District Court Properly Considered the Ability of 
Plaintiffs to Litigate via Joinder 
 
 The Majority also characterizes the District Court’s 
ruling as focusing not on the ability of the plaintiffs to litigate 
via joinder but “focus[ing] instead on whether the individual 
plaintiffs could have brought their own, individual suits.” See 
Majority Op. 44. I disagree. To the contrary, the focus of the 
District Court’s opinion is on joinder throughout.5 See, e.g., 
                                              
 5 The Majority, citing references to “individual suits” 
in the District Court’s opinion, posits that “[e]ven a cursory 
look at the section on the ability and incentive of the class 
members to litigate reveals that the District Court was 
focused on the alternative of individual suits, not on joinder.” 
See Majority Op. 44 n.23. But the two concepts are not 
exclusive of each other, as the Majority itself recognizes in 
footnote 19, when it “read[s] Marcus’s language about the 
ability ‘to litigate individually,’ to refer to each plaintiff 
appearing on the record as a joined party, and not whether 
each individual plaintiff can litigate his or her own claim as 
the sole plaintiff.” See Majority Op. 42 n.19 (citation 
omitted). Litigation not pursued on a classwide basis is 
individual litigation, even if pursued via joinder, and the 
parties joined in a proceeding remain responsible for the 
individual litigation of their claims. See 7 Wright & Miller, 
supra, § 1652 (“Consequently, rights that are separate and 
distinct under the governing law are not transformed into joint 
10 
 
JA-020-22 (“Joinder of the absent class members would 
likely require additional rounds of discovery, which would 
only further delay a trial date.”); (“The considerable 
geographic dispersion of the parties would certainly present 
challenges to plaintiffs in attempting to coordinate the 
litigation if all class members were joined, particularly if 
additional discovery was required.” (emphasis added)); 
(“Accordingly, Plaintiffs have demonstrated by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the parties are sufficiently 
numerous so as to make joinder impracticable.”).  
 
 The Majority makes its own contrary finding, 
surmising that the class members “appear likely to have the 
ability and incentive to bring suit as joined parties.” See 
Majority Op. 45.6  It directs the District Court on remand to 
consider whether it would be “uneconomical” for the six 
smaller class members to be joined. It thus instructs the 
District Court to make the case for joinder—a case the 
defendants failed to support themselves. The defendants 
offered little argument (let alone evidence) before the District 
Court that, notwithstanding the vast geographic dispersion of 
the plaintiffs, surely joinder would be practicable. Indeed, at 
oral argument, counsel for Ranbaxy was asked whether 
joinder was impracticable and responded, “I don’t know.” 
                                                                                                     
rights when plaintiffs join under Rule 20 in a federal court 
action; each plaintiff’s right of action remains distinct, as if it 
had been brought separately.”).  
 6 This assertion stems from the defendants’ argument 
that “[e]ach of the 16 absent class members has the ability 
and the financial incentive to file its own claim.” See 
Appellants’ Br. 45. The Majority adopts this speculation as 
fact, but it is mere argument and speculation.  
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Oral Arg. at 9:30-10:00.7 The Majority is erecting roadblocks 
that do not exist.  
 
 Moreover, if one were to speculate as to the likelihood 
of these plaintiffs, many competitors in a relatively small 
market, agreeing to come together—for surely they couldn’t 
be forced to do so—the speculation would be to the contrary. 
Experience would dictate that many obvious practical reasons 
stand in the way of joinder: desire to have one’s self and own 
law firm control the litigation, choice of favorable forum, 
familiarity with the local jurisdiction’s laws and procedures, 
fear of being dragged into settlement, and concerns about the 
costs of litigating in a far-flung locale. Further, the larger 
plaintiffs could clearly afford to go their own way. Even in 
cases that come before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation for joinder, where the issue involves only pre-trial 
proceedings,8 plaintiffs invariably raise reasons for opposing 
joinder.9 How can we possibly assume that the plaintiffs 
                                              
 7 An audio recording of the oral argument is available 
online at 
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/15-
3475InReModafinil.mp3 
 8 This case would not be appropriate for an MDL as it 
is ready for trial and pre-trial proceedings are largely 
completed.  
 9 See, e.g., In re: Sci. Drilling Int’l, Inc., FLSA Litig., 
24 F. Supp. 3d 1364, 1364-65 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (“Plaintiffs 
oppose centralization as unnecessary, stating that they 
recognize the overlap in the actions and they already have 
agreed to coordinate pretrial proceedings to avoid duplicative 
discovery and inconsistent rulings.”); In re: Standard & 
Poor’s Rating Agency Litig., 949 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1361 
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would have the “ability and incentive” to bring suit as joined 
parties? If the defendants had supported such a notion, that 
would be another matter. But the Majority asks the District 
Court to make its own record as to practicability. That is not 
our role, nor the role of the District Court.  
 
* * * 
 Lastly, I am struck by the inescapable fact that this 
case has proceeded as a class action for years and nothing 
about it cries out for anything but class treatment.10 One has 
                                                                                                     
(J.P.M.L. 2013) (“Plaintiffs oppose centralization and argue, 
inter alia, that the Panel has never centralized litigation of 
this type, that transfer to a distant forum will inconvenience 
the states, and that transfer is unnecessary in light of the 
historic cooperation among state attorneys general.”); In re 
Le-Nature’s, Inc., Commercial Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 
1373-74 (J.P.M.L. 2009) (“Plaintiffs opposed to 
centralization argue, inter alia, that (1) the allegations 
pertaining to the bottling actions make up only a minimal part 
of the Trustee’s case; (2) all active parties to the bottling 
actions have admitted that Le–Nature’s perpetrated a 
systematic fraudulent scheme and, therefore, a large portion 
of the allegations set forth in the Trustee’s action is 
insignificant to the bottling actions; (3) the bottling actions 
are straightforward fraud cases that can readily be handled by 
their respective district courts; and (4) discovery can be 
coordinated in the bottling actions without centralization.”). 
 10 The Majority contends that this is no “run-of-the-
mill class action” given the top-heavy distribution of the 
claims among the class members. See Majority Op. 48. But 
whether the class looks like other classes is not controlling as 
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only to read the Majority’s analysis of the real issues before 
the Court to conclude that it is unimaginable that this case 
should be torn apart at this late date and sent to the far corners 
of the United States to start over again as separate actions 
before several judges, each deciding anew the identical issues 
facing each plaintiff’s claims. It should not be remanded at 
this late date.  
 
 This should not happen because Judge Goldberg has 
ably managed this case for a decade and properly considered 
every factor we have ever held to be relevant in determining 
whether a class is so numerous that joinder would be 
impracticable. He has not abused his discretion in so doing or 
made clearly erroneous findings of fact. I would therefore 
affirm the judgment of the District Court in its entirety. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from Part III.A of the 
Majority’s opinion.   
                                                                                                     
to whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been met. Rule 
23 was “designed to allow an exception to the usual rule that 
litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual 
named parties only.” Califano, 442 U.S. at 700-01 (emphasis 
added). The plaintiff’s burden under Rule 23 is merely to 
demonstrate compliance by a preponderance of the 
evidence—not to establish “proof beyond any doubt.” Reyes 
v. Netdeposit, LLC, 802 F.3d 469, 485 (3d Cir. 2015). Here, 
given the evidence the plaintiffs have adduced regarding, 
inter alia, the impracticability of joinder and the 
predominance of common questions of law and fact, and 
given the paucity of contrary evidence adduced by the 
defendants, I reiterate that nothing about this case cries out 
for anything but class treatment. 
